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Will-Executory Devise in Case of Intestacy.
Testator, in the second paragraph of one of, the clauses of his will,
gave a portion of an estate known as the Wakefield Mills in trust for his
two grandsons, naming them. In the third paragraph he gave the
remaining portion of the Wakefield Mills estate in trust for the two
grandsons aid their sister, naming all the persons. Immediately after
the gift was a reference to the property devised to the grandsons in the
second clause. Following this reference was the following: "I hereby
forbid that the property shall bb sold out of the family, but leaving
them to dispose of their respective parts by will. In case of the death
of either one of them intestate without direct heirs, I direct that such
intestate part shall be held by his sister." Held,that the attempt at an
executory limitation in case of the death of the grandsons intestate,
without direct heirs, transgressed the rule that it must not be within the
power of the first taker to defeat the devise over either by the execution
of a will or a deed.
EXECUTORY IDEVISES TO TAME EFFICT IN CASE OF TmIE NON-DISPOSITION OF THE ESTATE EY THE FIRST TAKER.
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courts ascribe the origin of this
rule is thaf of Gulliver v. Vaux,
8"D: M. & G., 167, a nisi Prius
- case decided in x746, but not rep" rted until more than a century
later. In this case there was a
devise ofreal estate to the testator's
children, and in case of the death
of the children without leaving
* issue and "without appointing the
disposal of the same," then over.
It was argued that the devise over
was not good as an executory devise because it was too remote.
This contention, however, was not
sustained, and two of the judges
-gave opinions holding the devise
over valid. The third judge rendered an opinion in which he concurred with his brethren as to the
validity of the devise over on the
score of remoteness, but insisted
that the gift over was. bad because
it was to take effect upon a void
contingency.
"But I am clearly of the opinion," said the learned judge, "that
this condition or contingency annexed to the estate of the
children
and precedent to that of t e devisee's estate, is a void condition, and
consequently the devise dependent
upon it can never take place. A
condition or contingency repugnant to the estate devised must be
void; thus a devise to one in fee,
upon condition that he shall not
alien, is void: Co. Litt., 223. So a
devise in fee upon condition that
the wife shall not be endowed or
the husband be tenant by the
curtesy is void because repugnant
to the estate devised: Mary Partington's Case, io Co., 38; Sir Anthony's Case, 6 Co., 4a. So feoffment in fee, upon condition that
the feofe's daughters shall not inherit, is void because repugnant to
the nature of the estate. What is
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the condition here? That if" the
children die without issue "the
heirs shall not take by descent, but
by appointment, whereas a devise to
a man's heir at law, or grant to heirs
is void, and he will take by descent :
Counden v. Clerke, Hob., 30. In
this case, therefore, a devise in fee,
upon the condition that his heirs
shall not take by. descent, unless
he specially appoint them is a void
condition, and consequently the
devise subsisting on that condition
is void." The opinion of the latter
judge finally prevailed, the two
other judges concurring with him
upon conference.
The argument here is as follows:
The devise over in default of issue
or appointment by its terms precludes the heirs from taking save
by appointment. But an heir cannot take by appointment, but only
by descent. Therefore, the devise
over precludes the heirs from taking at all, and thus the fee simple
in the hands of the children would
be deprived of one of its essential
incidents, viz., -that of descending
to the heirs in accordance with the
rules of common Jaw, and is consequently void because repugnant
to the devise to the first taker.
The weak point in this argument
lies in the fact that every executory
devise deprives the estate of the
first taker of some one of the essential elements of a fee simple, and
is thus to a certain extent repugnant to the estate of the first taker.
Take the case of an ordinary executory devise; "to A and his heirs;
but if A die without issue living at
his death, then over to B." The
words "to A and his heirs" taken
alone vest in A an absolute fee
simple, which is freely alienable
and descendible to his heirs; but
the devise over stipulates that un-

-
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less A dies leaving issue, B shall
have the estate. Is not that devise
over repugnant to the absolute fee
simple? Does it not deprive the
estate which A would take, were it
not for the devise over, of some
essential incident of a fee? It is
clear that while A may sell his
estate, he'cannot convey a perfect
title to it. His title has a cloud
upon it, and that cloud is the limitation over to B. The incident of
alienability is, therefore, if not destroyed, very seiisibly diminished.
It is alsq perfectly clear that the
estate cannot descend to A's heirs
unless he dies leaving issue, or in
other words, only A's issue can
inherit the estate, and thus the
incident of being descendible to
heirs, in accorddnce with the rules
of common law, is taken awa'y.
It is thus very clear that the
most common form of an executory
devise deprives the estate of the first
taker of the very incident which,
the estate of the first taker in Gulliver v. Vaux was deprived of, and
is, therefore, open to the sane objection. The validity of the 6xecutory devise just spoken of is too
well established to admit of any
doubt, and thus the argument in
Gulliver v.Vaux falls to the ground.
The fallacy of this argument' lies
in the fact that the estate of, the
first taker was not an absolute fee
simple, but only a qualified fee
simple, to which the incident of
descending to heirs in accordance
with the rules of common law does
not necessarily belong.
In dealing with executory limitations 'of personalty the courts at
a very eatly date laid down the rule
that gifts over of what remained
undisposed by the first taker were
void, because as was said by Lord
TRURO in Watkins v. Williams, 3
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Macn. & G., 622, 629, "it might be
very difficult and even impossible.
to ascertain whether any part of
the fund remained undisposed or'
not." This reasoning, it will be
readily seen, does not apply to gifts
of xeal -property, for it would be
simple enough to determine how
much of a given pieceof real estate
was left undisposed of by the first
taker. It is perhaps notsurprising
therefore, when it ii remembered
that Gulliver v. Vaux was nbt re-"
ported until 1856, to find that before that time two cases were decided which seem to lay down a'
contrary rule.
The first of these cases is that of
Beachcroft v. Broome, 4T. R., 441,
decided in 179!. In this casethere
was a devise over in case of death'.
without settling or disposing,of th. -A
estate. The question was whether I
the first taker could sell and defeat,
the limitation over. The court'
heldthat he could, RNYON, Ch:J., -,
saying: "I should have thought it
extremely clear that on failure of the first limitation, the second !,
might have taken effect as an executory devise.' Though this remark of Lord K.ZNYON was not
necessary to the decision of the
case, it shows clearly that he had
either never heard of the doctritik
of Gulliver v. Vaux, or that he disapproved of it.
The second case is that of Doe
d. Stevenson v. Glover, i C. B., 448
-(1845). In this case there was a
devise to A aid his heir;, but if ',
A should die without issue then
living and should ndt have disposed of or parted with his interest .
in his lifetime, then to- B; and it
was held that the executory devise
to B was valid.
It will thus be seen that a distinction in regard to gifts over in

.
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'case of non-disposition, was made
between gifts of realty. and gifts of
personalty, and that as late as 1845.
Gulliver v. Vaux had not been followed. In 1856 an energetic lawyer by the name of Lee, having
made a diligent search among -the
manuscripts in Lincoln's Inn Library, brought to light the case of
.Gulliver v. Vaux, and upon it
mainly was the decision in Holmes
v. Godson, 8 D. M. & G., 152,
based. In this latter case there
was a devise to A and his heirs,
but if A died without making a
will, then to B. LordJustice TuRNxR in deciding the case said that
it seemed to him that there was no
distinction between cases relating
to real and personal estate. "In
truth the decisions in both cases
turn, as I apprehend, on this: The
law has said that if a man dies intestatc, the real estate shall go to
the heir, and the personal estate to
the next of kin, and any disposition
which tends to contravene that disposition which the law would make
is against the policy of the law and
therefore void."
This is merely another form of
stating the reasoning laid down in
Gulliver v. Vaux for a "disposition
which tends to contravene that disposition whiCh the law would
make" is a disposition which attempts to deprive the estate ofits incident'of being descendible according to law. It is true that FRY, J.,
in Shaw v. Ford, L. R., 7 Ch. D.,
669, draws a distinction between
the two reasons. He says (pp.
673-4): "Priinafacie,and speaking generally, an estate given by
will may be defeated on the happening of any event; but that general rule is subject to many important exceptions.
One of those
exceptions may, in my opinion, be
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expressed in this manner, that any
executory devise, defeating or
abridging an estate in fee by altering the course of its devolution,
which is to take effect at the moment of devolution and at no other
time, is bad. The reason alleged
for that is the contradiction or contrariety between the principle of
law which regulates the devolution
of the estate and the executory devise which is to take effect only at
the moment of-devolution and to
alter its course. 'I am not bound
to inquire into the logical sufficiency of the reason given, because
it appears to me that the exception
is well established by the cases of
Gulliver v.Vaux, Holmes v. Godson and Ware v. Cann. Another
exception to the general proposition which I have stated is this,
that any executory devise which is
to defeat an estate, and which is to
take effect in the exercise of any
- right incident to that estate, is void;
and there again the alleged reason
is the contrariety or contradiction
existing between the nature of the
estate given and the nature of the
executory devise over."- It will be
seen, however, that the final reason
suggested by FRY, J., for holding
an executory devise bad in the two
instances given, is the "contrariety
or contradiction between the principle of law, which regulates the
devolution of the estate, had the
executory devise which is to take
effect only at the moment of devolution." Evidently, what is meant
-bythe words "contrariety or contradiction" existing between the
nature of the estate given and the
nature of the devise over, is that
the latter by its terms deprives the
former of some one or more of its
essential incidents. Thus in Gulliver v. Vaux the devise over de-
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prived the estate of its incident of
descendibility, and in Stephenson
v. Glover the devise deprived the
precedent estate of the incident of
being aliened by will.
A reason for holding void a gift
over in case of intestacy, is suggested by Sir GEORGE JESSEL in
re Wilcock's Settlement, x Ch. D.,
231, where he says, it is because a
man cannot give property absolutely, and at the same time say it
shall not devolve according to law.
This, however, is merely another
way of saying, that where an executory devise by its terms would
change the -manner of devolution
of the preceding estate, it deprives
it of one of the common law incidents of a fee.
It will thus be geen that the reasoning of theEuglish Courts in arriving at the rule under consideration, is that an executory- devise
to take effect in case of the nondisposition of the estate of the first
taker, whether by will or deed, deprives the first estate of some one
of its essential incidents, and is,
therefore, repugnant to it and void.
That this reasoning is fallacious
has been clearly shown, the fallacy lying in the fact that every
executory devise deprives the
estate upon which it is limited of
some incident essential to an absolute fee simple, so much so that
the estate upon which the executory devise is limited, is called
not an absolute fee, but a qualified
fee.
In America the courts have laid
down a rule which, though differing from the English rule in principle, amounts practically to the
same thing on account of the extended application which has been
given to it.
The first case in this country
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which decided that a gift over in
case the first taker had not disposed of his interest was void, is
that of Ide v. Ide., 5 Mass., Soo, decided in 18o9. In this case there
was a devise over "of what estate
devised to him he shall leave."
Chief Justice PARSONS, in deciding
the case, held, that from the terms
of the devise over an intention of
the testator was implied that the
first taker should have an "absolute property" in the estate devised, and that a limitation over
was "inconsistent with such absolute proprietorship" in the first
taker, and, therefore, void. Here
we see an entirely new reason advanced for holding void executory
devises to take effect in case of a
non-disposition of the estate by the
first taker. For this new view of
the question, the only authorities
cited by the chief justice are the
case of Attorney-General v. Hall,
Fitz., 314, but better reported in W.
Kel., 13, and Fearne, on Remainders, 226, 227. Let us glance at
these authorities for a moment,
and see whether they fairly sustain
the rule as laid down by Chief
Justice PARSONS.
Attorney General v. Hall was a
case in which a testator devised
realty and personalty to his son,
Francis Hall, and the heirs of his
body, and if he should die leaving
no heirs of his body living, then
so much of the real and personal
estate as he should be possessed of
at his death to go to the Goldsmith's Company. Francis Hall
suffered a common recovery, and
devised the real and personal estate
to his wife, and then died without
issue. A question arose between
the wife, claiming under her husband's will and the company claiming by virtue of the limitation over
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in case "of the son dying without
heirs of his- body. The Court decided in favor of the wife, holding
the limitation to the Goldsmith's
Company void.
The grounds for this decision do
not clearly appear*from the report
'of the case. It will be seen at a
glance, however, that a proper
common law construction of the
words of the testator's will would
give to Francis Hall an estate tail
in the real property with a contingent remainder to the Gold-

smith's Company: Fearne on Remainders, Ed. 1845, p. 387; and an

absolute estate in the personalty:
Tudor's Lead. Cas. on Real Prop.,
-p. 86:, el seq.; the limitation to the
Goldsmith's Company being void
at common law, because Francis
Hall had not merely the use of the
personalty, but the personalty it-

self: Fearne on. Remainders, p.
4o2.

According to this construc-

tion, Francis Hall, by suffering the
common recovery, barred the con-

tingent remainder to the Goldsmith's

Company, and

became

seizea of the real proprety in fee.
As the limitation over of the personalty was void, both realty and
personalty passed to the wife by
virtue of Francis Hall's will, and
she was, therefore, entitled to hold
them against the Goldsmith's Company.
That such was the construction
which the court placed upon the
will of the testator, though it does
not, as was said above, clearly appear from the report of the case,
will become plainly evident upon
a more careful examination of the
case, and upon reference to comment upon the case by Lord
HARr wIcKE.
In the report of Attorney General v. Hall, to be found in W.
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Kel., 13, it is said: "As to the real
estate, the defendant.., pleaded
a common recovery .
.
and
upon arguing this plea the court
allowed the same . . . so that
the only question now before the
court was whether the limitation
over to the Goldsmiths' Company
was a good limitation over of personal estate." It is thus very clear
that so far as the regl property was
concerned, the construction mentioned above is that adopted by
the court, and that so far as the
validity of an executory limitation
was concerned, the decision was in
regard to personalty alone.
In regard to the personal property it was argued at great length
that the limitation over was void,
and two grounds for the argument
were suggested: (I) That the personalty was "vested" and not the
4"use only devised," and (2) that
the limitation overwas void because
"not confined to dying without
issue at the time of Francis Hall's
death." The opinion of the Court
is reported as follows: "In regard
the ownership and property of the
personal estate was vested in Francis Hall and not the use only; this
was held to be a void limitation to
the Goldsmith's Company. It is
giving a man a .sum of money to
spend and limiting over to another
what does not happen to be spent."
These words, while by no means
clear, strongly support the inference that the court held the limitation void because Francis Hall had
not merely the use of the personalty, but the personalty itself. The
correctness of this inference appears to be practically certain
when we read Lord HARDBWICKE'S
comment on the case in Flanders
v. Clark, I Ves., 9, where he says:
"In Attorney General v. Hall the
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testator gave to his son personal
estate, and if he died without issue
then so much as shall remain to
the Goldsmith's Company; the
son died with[out] issue and it
was insisted that he had only an
usufructory interest and so to go
over; but it was determined by
Lord KING that he had the absolute property and therefore the
devise was void; for he had power
to spend the whole, which was an
absolute gift."
It seems, therefore, almost absolutely certain that all the case
of Attorney General v. Hall decides is that a common recovery
will bar a contingent remainder
limited on an estate tail and that
an executory limitation of piersonalty is not good. where the first
taker has an absolute property in
the estate as distinct from a gift of
the mere use of it. That this case,
therefore, is in no way applicable
to the case of an executory devise
of real property to take effect in
case the first taker does not dispose
of his estate, is too apparent to
necessitate further comment, and
yet this is the only plausible authority for Chief Justice PARSON'S
view, the passage cited from Fearne
being wholly inapplicable.
Thus we see that in this country
the rule in regard to executory
devises to take effect in case of a
non-disposition of the estate by
the first taker owes its origin to an
entire misconception of an old
English case. No court has as yet
recognized the fact that Ide v. Ide
is based upon a misconception of
Attorney General v. Hall, and
throughout a long line of decisions
we find the two cases cited again
and again with approval as positive authority for the rule. In
Jackson v. Bull, io Johns., i9
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(1813), Jackson v. Delancey, 13
Johns., 537 (1816) and Jackson v.
Robins, 16 Johns., 537 (I819), both
cases are cited with approval and
in the latter case there is a long and
exhaustive opinion by Chancellor
KENT. He says that there was no
distinction between personalty and
realty made in Attorney General v.
Hall. He says that Lord HARDIwICKE gives his sanction to it in
Flanders v. Clark, i Ves., 9, and
adds that Lord KENyON'S remark
in Beachcroft v. Broome, 4 T. R.,
441, must have been made in loose
conversation on the bench. It
seems almost incredible that as
able a man as the Chancellor
should have failed so entirely to
get at the gist of the decision in
Attorney General v. Hall, and what
is still more incomprehensible is
that he should have misconstrued
the true meaning of the case after
reading, as he must have read,
what Lord HARDIWICKn said of it
in Flanders v. Clark.
Chancellor KENT, in addition to
citing Ide v. Ide with approval,
suggests another reason why such
executory limitations arevoid. He
says that it is of the essence of an
executory devise that the estate
upon which it is limited shall not.
be subject to destruction or alteration by the first taker. As authority
for this statement the Chancellor
cites Fearne on Remainders, 418,
where will be found the following
clause: "It is a rule that an executory devise cannot be prevented
by any alteration whatsoever in the
estate out of which, or after which
it is limited;" but it will be very
clearly seen on an examination of
Fearne that the learned author
never meant to lay down as a principle of law the view which the
Chancellor cites him as expressing.
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The meaning of this clause in
Fearne is simply that an executory
devise differs from a contingent
remainder in that it cannot be
barred by a fine or common recovery, which appears very clearly
in the opinion of Mr. Justice
WARDLAW in Andrews v. Roye.
(See infra this article.)
In Armstrong v. Kent, I Zab.
(N. J.), 5o9 (1848), the limitation
over was on the death of the first
taker "without heirs and intes.tate." The Court cited the cases
of Ide v. Ide andJackson v. Robins,
with approval, saying that it was
"well settled that where there is an.
absolute power of disposition given
by the will to the first taker; the
limitation-over, . . . is void as
being inconsistentwith.theabsolute
estate or power of disposition expressly given or necessarily implied," and "a power to devise by
will is as absolute a power as a
lpower to convey where conveyance
means by bargain and sale."
In. Hubbard v. Rawson, 4 Gray,
247 (.1855), it is true a different rule
is apparenily laid down. A devise
over in these terms, "and if she
make no disposition, the remainder
to be conveyed to her children,"
was held valid. The case of Ide
v. Ide was referred to, but passed
by with the remark that it was not
"parallel,"
the Court saying:
"This devise over is inconsistent
with the idea that the testator intended to devise an absolute estate
to 'the first taker ' so that in event
of her death it would descend to
her children or heirs at law as her
intestate estate. . . . The result
to which we come is that "tha first
taker" had only an equitable fee contihgent, liable to be defeated upon
her dying before her husband in
case the estate was not conveyed by

her-order and she had made no disposition of the property by will or
However, in a
other writing.!'
subsequent case, Gifford v. Choate,
ioo Mass., 343 (i868), in the same
court Ide v. Ide is cited with approval, and, therefore, Hubbard v.
Rawson must be considered as anomalous.

In Hall v. Robinson, 3 Jones Eq.
(N. C.), 348 (1857), while the Court
recognized the rule that the absolute power of disposition in the
first taker will-defeat a limitation
over, it was held that the power to
dispose of by will alon e was not an
absolute power of disposition.
In Andrews v. Roye, 12 Rich.
(S. C.), 536 (186o), there is a distinct dissent from Chancellor
KrNT's view, viz., -that there can
be no executory'devise limited on
an estate over which the owner may
exercise an absolute power of disposition, because it is of the essence
of such a devise that it cannot be
prevented or defeated by the first
taker.
Mr. Justice WARDLAw criticizes
this view of the law, and says it is
not found in any English book and
that respectable authority may be
found for the validity of such
limitations over, citing Beachcroft
v. Broome and Stevenson v. Glover.
He says: "It is said to be of the
essence of an executory devise that
it cannot be prevented or defeated
by the first taker by any Alteration
of the estate out of which or after
which it is limited, or by any-mode
of conveyance. This is altogether
true as to the right of the first taker
to bar the executory devise by fine
or common recovery; but it is
altogether fallacious if pressed to
the conclusion that the executory
devise must be independent of the
will or action of the owner of the
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precedent estate. In fact, all executory devises depend to some
extent on the discretion of the first
taker. The most common case of
a limitation over in this mode is on
the contingency of the first taker
dying without issue at his death,
and may he not marry with the
prospect of procreation, or refrain
from marriage at his caprice? So,
too, in many other instances, there
may be valid executory devises
dependent on the personal action
of the primary donee, as that he
shall marry with the consent of the
executors, shall go to Paris, shall
reside in Charleston, and shall not
visit Nahant or Newport."
It is to be observed, however,
that in a subsequent case in the
same court, it was held that a
devise over in case the first taker
should die without leaving a -will
was void, because dependent on a
condition repugnant to the'devise:
Moore '. Sanders, 15 S. C., 440
(183f).
In Karker's Appeal, 6o Pa., 141
(1869), there was an executory
devise over in case the first taker
died intestate and without issue.
The court below, BREWSTER, J., in
a long opinion in which he cites
Gulliver v. Vaux, Holmes v. Godson, and Jackson v. Robbins, held
that the executory limitation over
was void, as it was an attempt by
the testator " to make anew law of
intestacy," which "has not been
favored by the courts." The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of. the lower court in an opinion by
READ, J., in which "Jarman on
Wills" is cited as follows: "If,
therefore, lands be devised to A
and his heirs upon condition that
lie shall not alien or charge them
with an annuity, the condition is
voi'i. And in like manner a condi-
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tion or conditional limitation annexed to a devise in fee; purporting
to give the property over in case
the devisee shall die intestate or
shall not part with the property in
his lifetime, is repugnant and void,
since in the first case it would not
only defeat the rule of law, which
says that upon the death intestate
of an owner in fee simple his property shall go to his heirs at law,
but also deprive him of the power
of alienation by act intervivos, and
in the second case it would take
away the testamentary power from
an owner in fee": Jarman on Wills,
Vol. II, p. 15.
In Gillmer v. Daix, 141 Pa.,
5o5 (1891), the devise over was
expressed in these terms, viz.:
" Should he die without leaving to
any person, then to my brother."
The Court in a per curiam decision, held, that the most they could
make of the clause was that it was
an expression of the testator's desire that her son should make a
will, but added that even though
the clause denoted h condition that
he should make a will, the condition was void under the authorities.
In Fisher v. Wister, 154 Pa., 65
(1892), the Court handed down a
per curiam decision, in which they
adopt the reasoning of the learned
master. The master adopts Chancellor KENT'S view, that no executory devise can stand where the
first taker has an absolute power
of disposition.
From this review of the American cases, it will be seen that
while two cases, Hubbar V. Rawson and Andrews v. Roye, deny
the correctness of the rule evolved
from Attorney General v. Hall, and
while one case, Karker's Appeal,
intimates that the reason for the
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rule is that a testator cannot make
a new law of intestacy, yet the
great weighit'of authority supports
th6 view of Chief Justice PARSONS
•mnd Chanceller KurNT, that there
can be no executory devise limited
upon an estate to which there is
annexed the absolute power of disposition.
The reason for this view has
been said to be that a valid executory devise cannot be defeated at
the will and pleasure of the first
taker, and Fearne has been cited
as an authority to that effect: Jackson v. Bull, io Johns., 19. Mr.
Justice WARDLAW has, however,
very clearly demonstrated the fallacy'of this reasoning in Andrews
v. Roye (supra), and the real reason for the rule is, perhaps, nowhere as 'clearly stated as by Mr.
Henry Budd in a note to Sharswood and Budd's 2 Lead. Cas. on
Real Prop., p. 482, where he says:
'.'It is equally true that in the case
of an executory devise the court
does recognize a qualified fee
simple, and the only reason that a
general power of disposition added
thereto will destroy a devise over,
is that the general power adds to
the qualified fee just these qualities in which the qualified fee was
lacking, and, therefore, converts it
into an absolute fee simple, thereby
exhausting the entire estate of the
devisor."
To the mind of the writer, there
seems to be considerable force in
this contention.- Where an estate
is given to "A and his heirs," A
undoubtedly has the absolute control of the estate, which includes
the absolute power of disposition;
and the estate is called an absolute
fee simple. When an executory
devise is tacked on to such an
estate, this absolute control, and
with it the absolute power of dis-
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position, is qualified 4and made subject to the devise over, and the'
estate is called a qualified fee
simple.
It is, therefore, of the very essence of an executory devise to
reduce the estate upon which it is
limited from an absolute fee simple
to a qualified fee simple. It is
impossible for an executory devise
to be limited upon an absolute fee
simple, because thevery act of so
limiting it, reduces the absolute fee
to a qualified fee. An absolute fee
simple and an executory devise
cannot exist togetlier, because the
presence of the latter always reduces the former to a qualified fee
simple. The two estates are accordingly said to be repugnant to
each other.
Now, when either expressly or
from the terms of the devise over,
the absolute power of disposition
is given to A, the owner of the
estate upon which the executory
devise is litAited, A's estate possesses all the characteristics and incidents which it had before the
executory devise was limited upon
it. The qualified fee becomes once
more an absolute fee, or, in other
words" we have a case of an executory devise, limited upon an absolute fee without reducing it to a
quilified fee. But as has just been
said, these two estates cannot exist
together, for they are repugnant to
each other. It may, theref'ore, well
be contended that any attempt at
executory limitation, which creates
such a repugnancy, should not be
upheld.
However, it may on the other
hand be contended as follows: In
the case of the ordinary example
of an executory devise "to A and
his heirs, but if A die without leaving issue living then to B,"the
estate will eventually go to B and
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OF THE FIRST TAKER.

his heirs unless A die leaving issue.
It is clear, therefore, that A's
estate, though a fee simple, is
qualified in this respect-that
it cannot descend to his heirs
unless he die leaving issue. It
will thus be seen that A's estate
differs from an absolute fee simple
in that it cannot, on his death,
descend to his heirs unless they
are his issue. A's estate is, therefore, qualified in respect to its incident of descendibility as well as
its incident of alienability. Consequently, even though the absolute power of disposition were
given to A, his estate does not, as
was contended above, possess all
the characteristics and incidents
which it had before the executory
devise was limited upon it. It still
lacks the essential incident of an
absolute fee .simple of being descendible to heirs general, and is,
therefore, still a qualified fee, and
consequently is not repugnant to
a limitation over.
From the standpoint of strict
logical reasoning the latter contentfon appears to carry with it
considerable force. However, the
point is such a nice one, and the
reasoning partakes so much of the
nature of "hair splitting," that
the question may, perhaps, be said
to be one for the policy of the law
to settle. That it has been settled
both in England and this country,
to judge from the casescited, seems
clear. It is a curio-as and interesting fact to notice, however, that
the considerations which led to the
adoption of the rule in England
were entirely fallacious, and yet
have considerable support among
the authorities; while the considerations which led to the adoption
of the rule in this country, though
fr~m- a logical standpoint much less
opc . to the charge of fallacy, are,
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however, entirely without the support of authority among the old
English books. The American rule,
therefore, seems to be a new doctrine, the outgrowth of a misconception. It hardly seems possible
that anything good in law can be
based upon a mistake, and yet
there would, perhaps, be very little
to complain of if the application of
the-rulewerelimited to thosecases
to which it strictly applies.
The rule has, however, been extended in its application to cases
where the disposing power of the
first taker is very greatly qualified,
as was the case in Fisher v. Wister.
It will be readily seen that where
the first taker does not possess the
absolute power of disposition his
estate is not an absolute fee simple,
and might, therefore, well support
an executory limitation. This extended application seems, therefore,to be unwarrartted and weakens
to a great extent the soundness of
the rule.
In concluding this article it is
proper to remark that this subject
has been previously treated by a
no less able writer than Mr. John
C. Gray, in his very excellent work
on "Restraints on Alienation."
In justice to himself, the writer
desires to say that Mr. Gray's discussion of the subject was not discovered until after the preparatory
work on this article had been completed, and at a time when half of
the final work had been finished.
If an excuse were needed for publishing this article after such a discovery, it is sufficient to mention the exceeding interest of the
subject, and the fact that Mr. Gray's
work may not be readily accessible
to many of the readers of the
A=ERICAw LAW R] GISTK1 AND
REvIEw.
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